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RAISIN’ CONTENTIONS: A FARMER’S GRAPES OF WRATH
AND THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S QUESTIONABLE
TAKINGS ANALYSIS IN HORNE V. U.S.
DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause serves as a shield protecting individuals from bearing public burdens that society should
shoulder as a whole.1 The Supreme Court has recognized the essential need for such protection, extending the Fifth Amendment’s
guarantees to interests in specific parcels of real property and personal property alike.2 While the Court has found “no distinction”
between the protections afforded to personal and real property interests, it has applied varying tests to determine whether a taking
has occurred and whether compensation is due.3
In the arena of real property and land use, for example, the
Supreme Court has established significant authority, particularly
through Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n4 and Dolan v. City of
Tigard.5 From these cases, the Nollan-Dolan test emerged, which
stipulates that any conditional factors considered when issuing land
use permits must exhibit an “essential nexus” and be “roughly proportional” to the impact of the proposed development on the
1. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (defining purpose of
Takings Clause).
2. See, e.g., Webb’s Fabulous Pharms., Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164
(1980) (holding money confiscation unassociated with specific parcel of property
can constitute taking); Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 217 (2003)
(holding that interest accrued on monetary funds qualifies as property); United
States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 383-84 (1945) (holding owner’s interest in personal property protected to same extent as interest in real property).
3. See United States v. Burnison, 339 U.S. 87, 93 (1950) (noting lack of distinction due to broad state power). Compare Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427-38 (1982) (holding that permanent physical invasion of property effects per se taking), with Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n,
483 U.S. 825 (1987), and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (together
holding conditions on land use permits require “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality” to impact construction proposed).
4. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
5. 512 U.S. 374 (1994). See Catherine Contino, Monetary Exactions: Not Just
Compensation? The Expansion of Nollan and Dolan in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water
Management, 25 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 465, 473 (2014) (citation omitted) (discussing
significance of Nolan and Dolan in takings jurisprudence).

(385)
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land.6 In addition to the Nollan-Dolan test, the Court has recognized a number of categorical exceptions that constitute an unconstitutional, per se taking of personal and real property.7 With such
an inclusive ambit, the history of takings jurisprudence is rife with
complex application, continuous litigation, and often, confusing
precedent.8
It was against this expansive and convoluted backdrop that the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a curious
ruling, applied the Nollan-Dolan test in Horne v. United States Dep’t of
Agric.,9 extending the test not to conditions on land use permits—
or real property at all—but to raisins.10 In Horne, the Ninth Circuit
determined whether a government regulation requiring certain
farmers to allocate a portion of their annual raisin crop to the government, without any guaranteed compensation, constituted an unconstitutional taking.11 In its analysis, the court first distinguished
the raisins as distinctly personal property and, as a result, determined the heightened scrutiny of certain categorical per se takings
rules did not apply.12 Instead, the court ruled that the Nollan-Dolan
land use test was appropriate to analyze this alleged taking of
uniquely personal property, likening the allocation requirement of
the government regulation to a condition on private land use.13
Executing the test, the Ninth Circuit held that the allocation requirement exhibited an “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality” to its stated purpose of stabilizing market conditions.14
The Ninth Circuit’s dismissal of a categorical takings approach
regarding personal property and extension of the Nollan-Dolan test
to personal property appears inconsistent and contrary to both
6. See id. at 374-75 (holding permit conditions “roughly proportional” to development impact are not takings); see also Nollan, 483 U.S. at 842-43 (noting condition must exhibit “essential nexus” to pass constitutional muster).
7. See, e.g., Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426 (holding government’s permanent physical
invasion of private property works per se taking); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992) (holding regulations depriving owner of all
economically viable use of property works per se taking); United States v. General
Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 381-83 (1945) (holding owner’s interest in personal
property protected to same extent as real property interest).
8. For a discussion of the relevant background to Takings Clause jurisprudence, see infra, notes 41-173 and accompanying text.
9. 750 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2014).
10. See id. at 1141-42 (holding to extend Nollan-Dolan test).
11. See id. at 1133-34 (describing government regulation at issue in case).
12. See id. at 1140-41 (dismissing categorical approach of analysis).
13. See id. at 1142-43 (explaining necessity of Nollan-Dolan test here).
14. Horne v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 750 F.3d 1128, 1144 (9th Cir.
2014) (stating holding of case).
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Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent.15 With this sweeping
expansion of Nollan-Dolan review, lower courts may struggle to determine when, and under which circumstances, the test applies to
personal and real property matters.16 Further, this decision may
open the door to future challenges to similar environmental regulations, threatening the government’s ability to safeguard the
environment.17
This Note examines the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Horne holding that the federal regulation requiring allocation of private raisin
crops to the government did not constitute a taking, and further
analyzes the court’s decision-making process.18 Part II provides a
factual summary of Horne.19 Part III reviews the origin and impact
of the applicable government regulation, and further analyzes the
evolution of relevant Takings Clause jurisprudence.20 Part IV reviews the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Horne.21 Part V presents a critical analysis of the court’s reasoning and holding, specifically
examining its distinction between personal and real property, and
the court’s choice to implement the Nollan-Dolan test over other
methods of analysis for takings challenges.22 Finally, Part VI examines the decision’s potential impact on Takings Clause jurisprudence and possible future conflicts of similar posture.23

15. For a further critical analysis of the Ninth Circuit’s application of the test,
see infra notes 220-62 and accompanying text.
16. For a further discussion of the ruling’s potential impact, see infra notes
263-82 and accompanying text.
17. For a further discussion of the ruling’s potential impact, see infra notes
263-82 and accompanying text.
18. For a narrative analysis of Horne, see infra notes 173-219 and accompanying text. For a critical analysis of Horne, see infra notes 220-62 and accompanying
text.
19. For a discussion of the relevant facts of Horne, see infra notes 24-40 and
accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of all relevant background information, see infra notes
41-172 and accompanying text.
21. For a narrative analysis of Horne, see infra notes 173-219 and accompanying text.
22. For a critical analysis of Horne, see infra notes 220-62 and accompanying
text.
23. For a discussion of the potential impact of Horne, see infra notes 263-82
and accompanying text.
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II. FACTS
The Appellants in Horne, Marvin and Laura Horne (the
Hornes), have been California raisin farmers since 1969.24 In 2004,
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) initiated an
enforcement action against the Hornes, seeking nearly $700,000 in
fines for their alleged violation of a federal policy that required
farmers of certain crops to allocate a portion of their annual crop
yield to the federal government.25
The Marketing Order Regulating the Handling of Raisins Produced from Grapes Grown in California (the Marketing Order) was
the regulation at the center of the dispute.26 The Marketing Order
is a complex regulatory program that requires raisin “handlers” to
divert a percentage of the annual crop yield they receive from raisin
“producers” to a national reserve.27 The government then diverts
this reserved portion from the open market and sometimes sells it
in foreign or noncompetitive domestic markets.28 The diversion allows the government to control the amount of raisins that enter the
market, and thus facilitates the government’s ability to assure a constant supply and price, eliminating the threat of oversaturation of
the raisin supply in the market.29 Any farmer who fails to comply

24. Evan J. Seeman, I HEARD IT THROUGH THE GRAPEVINE: The Impact
of Horne v. United States Department of Agriculture, 65 PLAN. & ENVTL. LAW No.
9, 7 (Sept. 2013) (describing parties to action).
25. Horne v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 730 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir.
2014) (describing relief sought). The USDA sought relief for violations totaling
$695,226.92. Id. at 1135. Specifically, the fines included $8,783.39 in overdo assessments for the 2002-2003 and 2003-2004 crop years, $483,843.53 for the dollar
equivalent of the raisins not sent to reserve, and $202,600.00 as a civil penalty for
failure to comply with the marketing order. Id. at n. 6.
26. 7 C.F.R. pt. 989 (current through April 5, 2015) (exhibiting title of
regulation).
27. Horne, 750 F.3d at 1132 (describing provisions of Marketing Order). The
Marketing Order delineates the duties of “producers,” those who grow and cultivate the raisins, and “handlers,” those who prepare and sell the free tonnage of
raisins. Id. at 1133. It directs handlers to comply with its regulations and divert a
portion of the crop to the government. Id. For further discussion of purpose of
Marketing Order, see infra notes 49-61 and accompanying text.
28. Horne, 750 F.3d at 1133 (describing use of reserve tonnage). Noncompetitive domestic markets include school lunch programs and other related programs.
See Seeman, supra note 24. For further discussion of use of diverted raisins, see
infra notes 49-61 and accompanying text.
29. See Horne, 750 F.3d at 1133 (describing purpose of Marketing Order). For
further discussion of purpose and history of Marketing Order, see infra notes 49-61
and accompanying text.
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with the regulation is subject to fines at the discretion of the Secretary of Agriculture (Secretary).30
Beginning in the early 2000s, the Hornes began to view the
Marketing Order as antiquated and sought to avoid falling subject
to its authority.31 Accordingly, the Hornes elected to restructure
their raisin cultivation by not only growing their own raisins, but
also stemming, sorting, and packaging the raisins for sale themselves, thereby eliminating the need to send their crop to handlers
altogether.32 The Hornes believed that, despite assuming all of the
duties that a handler would traditionally undertake, they would not
qualify as “handlers” as understood by the Marketing Order for raisins they produced.33 Thus, because the Hornes believed their operations to be outside of the Marketing Order’s purview, they
declined to supply the government with the proportion of their raisin crops between 2002 and 2004.34 The Secretary, however, disagreed, and brought an enforcement action against the Hornes for
failing to comply with the Marketing Order from 2002 through
2004.35 After an administrative hearing, the USDA imposed a fine
of $695,226.92.36
The Hornes sought review of the USDA’s decision and relief
on the grounds that the Marketing Order constituted an illegal taking prohibited by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Consti30. Horne, 750 F.3d at 1133 (describing consequences for noncompliance).
For further discussion of consequences of the Marketing Order, see infra notes 4961 and accompanying text.
31. Horne, 750 F.3d at 1134 (noting Hornes’ perspective on Marketing Order). The Marketing Order was a direct statutory descendent of New Deal and
World War II era legislation. Id. For further discussion of the history of the Marketing Order, see infra notes 49-61 and accompanying text.
32. Horne, 750 F.3d at 1134 (describing Hornes’ attempt to contravene Marketing Order). Stemming, sorting, and packaging the crop were all traditional
duties of “handlers.” Id. The Hornes performed these same tasks on behalf of
other raisin producers on a per-pound fee basis, so as to allow those producers
similar avoidance of the Marketing Order. Id.
33. Id. (noting Hornes’ belief). Similarly, the Hornes also believed that they
would not qualify as “handlers” for third party raisins as, instead of acquiring actual title to the raisins like normal handlers do, the Hornes charged a per-pound
fee. Id.
34. See id. at 1134 (describing Hornes’ failure to reserve exaction for federal
government). The annual percentage requirements totaled forty-seven and thirty
percent of raisin crops during the 2002-2003 and 2003-2004 crop years respectively. Id.
35. Id. at 1135 (describing charges against Hornes). As the USDA applied
these penalties, it took into account in the third parties’ crop that the Hornes
handled, and applied it to the total accordingly. Id.
36. Id. at 1134 (discussing penalties imposed). This total reflected penalties
plus the dollar equivalent for the raisins not reserved for the government. Id. For
further discussion of specific total amounts, see supra note 25.
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tution.37 Upon review, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the Marketing
Order under the Nollan-Dolan test.38 The court held that the Marketing Order did not qualify as an unconstitutional taking, as it exhibited an essential nexus between the means and ends that the
Order sought, and established, a rough proportionality between the
structure of the Marketing Order and its stated goal of market stabilization.39 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit upheld the fine.40
III. BACKGROUND
In Horne, the Ninth Circuit applied already-complex takings jurisprudence to an exceedingly intricate federal regulation.41 In a
narrow holding, the court determined that monetary exactions associated with the Marketing Order did not violate the Takings
Clause.42 This section will present and review all relevant background information needed to comprehend the court’s reason37. Horne, 750 F.3d at 1135 (discussing Hornes’ claims). Similarly, the
Hornes sought relief on the basis that the penalties violated the Eighth Amendment by virtue of their excessive nature, as well as the claim that they did not
qualify as “handlers” as understood under the Marketing Order. Id.
38. See id. at 1143 (discussing decision to implement Nollan-Dolan test). The
Hornes’ claim proceeded through an extensive procedural posture prior to its appearance before the Ninth Circuit in this instance, which was actually the second
time the Ninth Circuit reviewed this case. Id. at 1134. Initially, the District Court
granted summary judgment in favor of the government on all counts. Id. at 1135.
The Hornes then appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the District
Court’s findings with respect to the Hornes’ statutory claims, their qualification as
“handlers,” as well as their Eighth Amendment claim. Id. (citation omitted). The
Ninth Circuit, however, held that it lacked jurisdiction over the Fifth Amendment
takings claim. Id. Specifically, in accordance with the Tucker Act, which requires
takings claims totaling over $10,000 be reviewed by the Federal Claims Court, the
Ninth Circuit held that the authority for the claim lay in the hands of the Federal
Claims Court. Id. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit
and held that the Hornes, as handlers, may assert a constitutional defense to the
USDA’s action in district court. Id. The Court held that the AMAA withdrew
Tucker Act jurisdiction over the claim and asserted that it would “make little sense
to require the party to pay the fine in one proceeding and . . . sue for recovery of
that same money in another proceeding.” Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 133 S.Ct. 2053,
2063 (2013). The Court then remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit to
determine the merits of the Hornes’ takings claim. Horne, 750 F.3d at 1135.
39. Horne, 750 F.3d at 1144 (discussing holding of case). The court heavily
relied on the distinction that the raisins, as personal property, were subject to far
less protection from governmental intrusion than real property, and that such regulation is “foreseeable.” Id. This fact, in addition to the finding that the regulations strive to preserve as much ownership rights to the raisins as possible guided
the court to find that the regulations did not constitute a taking. Id. For further
discussion of the court’s reasoning, see infra notes 173-219 and accompanying text.
40. Horne, 750 F.3d at 1144 (discussing holding of case).
41. See id. at 1142 (discussing complex factors of both takings law and regulation at issue).
42. See id. (noting narrow holding of case).
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ing.43 Section A will review the statute that promulgates the
Marketing Order, as well as the Marketing Order’s stipulations.44
Section B will review the development and application of takings
jurisprudence through the analysis of Supreme Court precedent,
specifically examining regulatory and categorical takings analyses.45
Section C will examine takings jurisprudence addressing the taking
of personal property.46 Section D will consider the Supreme
Court’s analysis of takings regarding monetary exactions.47 Finally,
Section E will review the Ninth Circuit’s application of takings jurisprudence through case law.48
A. The Marketing Order: Origins and Stipulations
The USDA originally promulgated the Marketing Order to
avoid the severe economic distress that pervaded both the agricultural and economic markets in years leading up to and through the
Great Depression.49 The Marketing Order’s statutory foundation is
grounded in the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937
(AMAA), New Deal legislation intended to “establish and maintain
such orderly marketing conditions for agricultural commodities in
interstate commerce as will establish . . . parity prices.”50 Pursuant
43. For a discussion of Ninth Circuit’s analysis, see infra notes 173-219 and
accompanying text.
44. For a discussion of origins and stipulations of Marketing Order and related statutory guidelines, see infra notes 49-61 and accompanying text.
45. For a discussion of takings jurisprudence regarding regulatory and categorical analyses, see infra notes 62-98 and accompanying text.
46. For a discussion of takings cases regarding personal property, see infra
notes 99-112 and accompanying text.
47. For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s review of monetary exactions and
its intersection with takings law, see infra notes, 113-51 and accompanying text.
48. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s implementation of Supreme Court
takings jurisprudence, see infra notes 152-72 and accompanying text.
49. See Horne v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 750 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir.
2014) (citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 364 (1943); Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S.
168, 174-76 (1969)) (discussing extreme market fluctuations). The cited cases exhibit the extreme fluctuations, sometimes garnering such a high supply and low
demand that producers were compelled to sell for less than what could cover production costs. Id.
50. 7 U.S.C. §§ 602(a) et. seq (2012) (amended 2014). Specifically, the AMAA
was a direct statutory descendant of the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA), a key
piece of legislation comprising President Roosevelt’s New Deal. See generally,
Daniel Bensing, The Promulgation and Implementation of Federal Marketing Orders Regulating Fruit and Vegetable Crops Under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937,
5 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 3, 3-4 (1995) (discussing AAA history). The AAA
sought to unequivocally stabilize the spiraling agro-economic market by issuing
licenses for handling agricultural commodities, thereby facilitating the a controlled output of crop yields in the supply and subsequently creating a constant
and stable market for those goods. Id. at 3. While these licenses evolved into marketing orders through the passage of the AMAA in 1937, their purpose of promot-
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to the authority granted to it through the AMAA, the USDA possesses the ability to develop and implement marketing orders.51
Marketing orders are regulations controlling quantities of certain
crops present in the market at any one time via their distribution
and sale.52 Generally, marketing orders are designed to create market conditions that assure demand for the product through promotional programs, and encourage quality control.53
In 1949, the Secretary created the Marketing Order at issue in
Horne in response to growing concerns that the raisin market was
unstable.54 The Secretary delegated authority of the Marketing Order to the Raisin Administrative Committee (RAC) to execute the
policies of the order.55 The Marketing Order required the RAC to
annually review crop yields and inventory listings of raisin producers for the purpose of recommending what portion of that total
should be allocated to the government to control the total quantity
of raisins entering the commercial market.56
The Marketing Order specifically distinguishes “producers,”
those who grow and cultivate the crop, from “handlers,” those who
stem, prepare, and package the crop for sale.57 Producers ordinarily convey their marketable crop yield to the handlers, who then
are solely responsible for complying with the RAC’s stipulations for
ing and protecting a stable market remained unwavering. Id. at 4. For further
discussion of the history and evolution of both the AAA and the AMAA, see generally, id. at 3-5 (discussing history of both pieces of legislation).
51. See Bensing, supra note 50, at 5 (discussing USDA authority).
52. 7 U.S.C. § 602(2) (2012) (amended 2014).
53. See Bensing, supra note 50, at 5 (discussing purpose of marketing orders
generally).
54. See Horne 750 F.3d at 1133 (citing 7 C.F.R. pt. 989) (describing creation of
Marketing Order). For further discussion of policies of Marketing Order, see
supra notes 49-53 and infra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
55. See Horne, 750 F.3d at 1133 (describing delegation of authority in Marketing Order); see also, 7 C.F.R. § 989.26. The RAC was comprised of “industry representatives” that included both producers and handlers. Horne, 750 F.3d at 1141.
In fact, Mr. Horne was at one time an alternate member of the RAC, although he
never held a voting position. Id. at n. 15. Accordingly, the court determined that
the Hornes’ interests as producers were adequately represented in the structure
and makeup of the RAC. Id. at 1141.
56. See Seeman, supra note 24 (discussing responsibilities of RAC). While the
Marketing Order requires that handlers actually give the raisins to the government, the producers in fact shoulder the financial burden. Id. The handlers agree
to a preset price to prepare the raisins whereas the producers are not guaranteed
reimbursement for the portion of their crop allocated to the government. See
Horne, 750 F.3d. at 1134. For further discussion of the producer/handler distinction, see supra note 27 and accompanying text.
57. See Horne 750 F.3d at 1133 (discussing distinction between producers and
handlers).
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raisin allocations.58 The government receives these reserved raisins
and prepares them to enter noncompetitive domestic markets or
sells them overseas for value.59 The RAC is the first to receive any
profits derived from overseas sales, and appropriates those funds to
cover its own administrative costs.60 Once those costs are reimbursed, producers are eligible to receive the remainder of the profits, if any, on a pro rata basis.61
B. The Fifth Amendment: Development and Application of
Regulatory and Categorical Takings Law
Takings Clause jurisprudence has tread a long and winding
path, stipulating intricacies and complexities that lower courts
struggle to interpret.62 The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution
provides the basis for these challenges, guaranteeing that “private
property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.”63 Through an extensive history of adjudication, the Supreme
Court has recognized a number of different types of takings.64 A
paradigmatic, categorical taking occurs where the government
physically appropriates or occupies private property.65 The clarity
of physical seizure or occupation, however, is contrasted by the vast
and ambiguous nature of regulatory takings jurisprudence.66
58. See id. at 1134 (citation omitted) (discussing channels raisins flow through
before allocation).
59. See id. (discussing destination for exacted raisins). Noncompetitive markets include areas such as government-subsidized school lunch programs.
Seeman, supra note 24.
60. See Horne, 750 F.3d at 1134 (discussing costs). The RAC is not federally
funded and operates solely from the disposition of the annual raisin allocations.
See id.
61. Id. (discussing profits returned to producers). The producers bear the
entire cost of the Marketing Order, not the handlers. The handlers, rather, operate under a pre-negotiated price for the portion of the raisins that are not subject
to this regulation. As such, only the producers are able to receive any profits from
the sale of the reserved raisins. Id. at 1133.
62. See id. at 1138 (citation omitted) (stating “[W]e must enter the doctrinal
thicket of the Supreme Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence”). For a discussion of Takings Clause jurisprudence, see infra notes 62-111 and accompanying
text.
63. U.S. CONST. amend. V (quoting the Fifth Amendment).
64. For a discussion of the various types of takings, see infra notes 62-111 and
accompanying text.
65. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (discussing
quintessential takings). In Lingle, the United States government seized a private
coalmine for government use. Id. Despite asserted war-time powers and subsequent necessity, the Supreme Court held that such occupation constituted an unconstitutional taking requiring just compensation. Id.
66. See Horne v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 750 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir.
2014) (describing difficult nature of regulatory takings jurisprudence analysis).
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Private property has long been a central focus of much dispute
regarding apparent takings.67 Government regulation of private
property has long been recognized as having the possibility of rising
to a level “so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or ouster.”68 The Supreme Court has since promulgated
three categories of regulations that work a categorical, or per se
taking, each represented by an exemplary case.69
First, any governmental “permanent physical invasion” of real
property works a per se taking.70 In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,71 an apartment owner challenged a New York state
law that required all owners of multi-family buildings to allow cable
companies to install cable equipment on their property.72 The
owners could not demand payment from the company in excess of
the amount determined reasonable by a State Commission.73 The
Supreme Court declared the regulation required a “permanent
physical occupation of property” and “such an appropriation is perhaps the most serious form of invasion of an owner’s property interests.”74 While some regulations may permissibly take a single
“strand” from the “bundle” of property rights owners normally enjoy, the New York regulation “chop[ped] through the bundle, taking a slice of every strand.”75 Accordingly, the Supreme Court held
any permanent physical invasion of private real property constitutes
a per se taking.76
Second, a regulation depriving an owner of all economically
valuable use of his or her real property also constitutes a per se
taking.77 In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,78 an individual
purchased two vacant beachfront properties, intending to develop
single-family homes.79 After his purchase, however, the South Car67. For further discussion of key private property takings cases, see infra notes
68-98.
68. See id. (citing Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538) (holding government regulations
can rise to level of unconstitutional taking).
69. Id. (discussing Supreme Court takings jurisprudence).
70. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 438
(1982) (noting holding of case).
71. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
72. See id. at 420-21 (discussing facts of case).
73. See id. at 421 (discussing facts of case).
74. Id. at 435-36 (noting seriousness of invasion).
75. Id. (noting impermissibly expansive reach of regulation).
76. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441 (declaring holding of case).
77. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992)
(discussing holding of case).
78. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
79. See id. at 1008-09 (explaining facts of case).
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olina legislature adopted legislation that sought to prevent erosion
on certain beachfront parcels, including the petitioner’s, consequentially rendering any development of his parcel impossible.80
As a result, the petitioner was left with two vacant lots without any
possibility of development.81 Upon review, the Supreme Court declared that a taking occurs whenever a regulation deprives an
owner of “all economically viable use of the land.”82 This holding
was unquestionably narrow, limited only to “the extraordinary circumstances where no productive or economically beneficial use of
the land is permitted.”83
Finally, two related Supreme Court cases, Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm’n and Dolan v. City of Tigard, represent a third type of
categorical taking.84 Together, these cases illustrate a nuanced rule
for takings analysis, referred to as the Nollan-Dolan test.85 This test
stipulates that a land use regulation requiring forfeiture of a property right constitutes a taking unless the regulation (1) exhibits an
“essential nexus” and (2) is “roughly proportional” to the specific
interests that the government seeks to protect.86
In Nollan, the Supreme Court addressed whether a state-imposed condition on a permit requiring a landowner to dedicate
part of his property to a public easement violated the Takings
Clause.87 The state claimed that it placed the condition on the permit to mitigate the diminished “visual access” to the ocean.88 The
Supreme Court held that there was “no nexus” between the condition-based exaction and the asserted state interest behind that exaction.89 Absent such an “essential nexus,” the condition constituted
a taking.90
The Supreme Court expanded upon Nollan’s holding in its
subsequent decision in Dolan.91 In Dolan, the petitioner applied for
80. Id. (discussing impact of legislation).
81. See id. at 1009 (describing issue petitioner faced).
82. Id. at 1004 (discussing holding of case).
83. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017-19 (discussing limits of holding).
84. For a discussion of both cases and their rules, see infra notes 87-98.
85. For further discussion of the cases and their rules, see infra notes 87-98.
86. See Horne v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 750 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir.
2014) (discussing Nollan-Dolan test).
87. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, at 828-29 (discussing facts of
case).
88. See id. at 829 (explaining reasoning behind easement).
89. See id. at 837 (describing analysis of Court).
90. See id. at 841-42 (discussing holding of Court).
91. For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s decision in Dolan, see infra notes
92-98.
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a city permit to expand and redevelop her property.92 The city
granted the permit on the condition that the individual dedicate a
portion of her land to the city for improvements to storm drainage
systems, as well as the construction of a pedestrian pathway.93 The
Supreme Court reviewed the petitioner’s claim through the provisions articulated in Nollan.94 The Court expanded upon Nollan, asserting that, if in fact an “‘essential nexus’ exist[ed] between the
‘legitimate state interest,’ [and the regulation at issue]” the Court
must then determine whether the government exhibited a “rough
proportionality” between the regulation and the overall impact of
the proposed development.95 The Court asserted that although a
“precise mathematical calculation” was not necessary, the state must
make an “individualized determination” of the connection between
the condition and the governmental interest.96 Accordingly, the
Court concluded the City had not put forth satisfactory findings regarding the impact the proposed development would cause.97 Despite its application to situations concerning real property, the
Supreme Court’s formulation of the Nollan-Dolan test served as a
basis for the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Horne, a case concerning the
taking of personal property.98
C. Personal Property and Takings Law
While the Supreme Court has delivered extensive guidance on
per se takings analysis regarding real property, it has not left analysis of per se takings regarding personal property to the imagination.99 In United States v. General Motors Corp.,100 the Supreme Court
addressed whether the Government’s act of destroying or reducing
the value of personal property requires the Government to compensate injured parties for the loss or reduction.101 There, the gov92. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 378-80 (1994) (discussing facts of
case).
93. Id. (describing conditions state placed on construction permit).
94. For a discussion of the Supreme Courts findings and ruling in Dolan, see
supra notes 92-93 and infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
95. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 (discussing Court’s analysis of claim).
96. Id. at 391 (stipulating requirements of “rough proportionality”).
97. Id. at 396 (discussing holding of case).
98. For further discussion of Ninth Circuit’s analysis, see infra notes 173-219
and accompanying text.
99. For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s Takings Clause analysis regarding
personal property, see supra notes 99-112 and accompanying text.
100. 323 U.S. 373, 382-83 (1945).
101. See id. at 381 (discussing third issue to address). The petitioner in this
case owned a building and rented a portion of it two the United States. Id. at 375.
Later, the Secretary of War issued a condemnation order on the building in order
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ernment implemented condemnation proceedings of a warehouse
General Motors occupied, justifying the act as necessary for military
purposes.102 General Motors used the warehouse for storage and
distribution of automobile parts; therefore, many items of personal
property were dismantled or demolished pursuant to the condemnation proceedings.103 Upon determination of whether compensation was due specifically for the destruction of this personal
property, the Court declared that “[a]n owner’s rights in [personal
property] are no less property within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment than his rights in land and the structures thereon erected.”104 Accordingly, the Court held that the government effected a per se taking of the owner’s personal property that
required compensation.105
Similarly, in United States v. Burnison106 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its position that personal property can be categorically
taken.107 Burnison involved a contested bequest of personal property to the United States.108 The petitioner claimed the disposition
of the property to the government was unlawful.109 The Court
held, however, that the receipt of gifts was within the power of the
government.110 In dicta, though, the Court noted that while the
gift did not violate the Takings Clause, personal property could be
taken in the same manner as real property.111 In finding “no distinction between realty and personalty,” the Court noted that “[a]n
authorized declaration of taking . . . will put realty or personalty at the
disposal of the United States for ‘just compensation.’”112

to obtain the building for military purposes. Id. The Supreme Court addressed
issues regarding the compensation needed for such a taking. Id.
102. See id. at 374 (describing government action).
103. See id. (discussing General Motors’ use of the space).
104. Id. at 383-84 (asserting that rights in personal property are equal to those
in real property and any taking requires just compensation).
105. See General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. at 384 (discussing holding of case).
106. 339 U.S. 87 (1950).
107. See id. at 90 (1950) (holding level of protection afforded to personal
property the same as that afforded to real property).
108. See id. at 89-90 (discussing facts of case).
109. See id. (noting petitioner’s claims).
110. See id. at 90 (discussing holding of case and government’s ability to lawfully receive gifts).
111. See Burnison, 339 U.S. at 92-93 (noting that personal property is no different than real property under Takings Clause analysis).
112. See id. at 93 n. 14 (emphasis added) (discussing Takings Clause application to both real and personal property alike).
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D. Monetary Exactions and Takings Law
The protection against a seizure of personal property does not
merely apply to physical fixtures, but also to fungible items such as
money.113 To qualify for protection under the Takings Clause,
however, the money must be linked to some property interest, a
notion that has been developed over a number of Supreme Court
decisions.114 An examination of the Supreme Court’s analysis of
the relationship between monetary exactions and unconstitutional
takings must begin with its decision in Eastern Enters. v. Apfel.115 In
Eastern Enters., the Court considered the Coal Act, legislation that
required the petitioner coal mining company to pay retroactively
additional medical benefits to its employees.116 While the Supreme
Court declared the Act unconstitutional, the Justices could not
agree on a rationale.117 A plurality of four Justices found that the
Act violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, determining that the legislation “permanently deprived [the company] of
those assets necessary to satisfy its statutory obligation.”118
While concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Kennedy offered a perspective on this issue that has been heralded as
creating a “second majority” to the case.119 Justice Kennedy stipulated that takings jurisprudence and the regulatory takings analysis
should be reserved for instances where “specific and identified”
113. See, e.g., Webb’s Fabulous Pharms., Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980)
(holding that government exaction of money related to any property interest constituted taking) (emphasis added); Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216
(2003) (holding interest accrued on monetary funds qualifies as property); Phillips
v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 156-57 (1998) (holding confiscation of
income interest payment constitutes taking).
114. See, e.g., Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 541 (1998) (plurality opinion) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (noting
specific and identifiable property interest is condition for regulatory taking);
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2601 (2013) (noting
direct link between monetary exaction and regulation can constitute taking). For
further discussion of monetary takings, see infra notes 113-51 and accompanying
text.
115. See Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 541 (1998) (plurality opinion)
(holding retroactive requirement of medical payments constituted taking). The
plurality, Justices O’Connor Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas, held that Congress
violated the petitioner’s constitutional rights by making it pay medical benefits for
its former coal mine workers retroactively. Id. Justice Thomas concurred in the
judgment, while Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer comprised a dissent. Id.
Justice Kennedy filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Id.
116. See id. at 499 (discussing retroactive requirement).
117. See id. at 498 (noting fractured nature of holding).
118. See id. at 538 (explaining holding of case).
119. See Lauren Reznick, Note, The Death of Nollan and Dolan? Challenging the
Constitutionality of Monetary Exactions in the Wake of Lingle v. Chevron, 87 B.U. L. REV.
725, 729 (June, 2007) (discussing Justice Kennedy’s second majority).
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property interests are at stake.120 While many cases reflect Justice
Kennedy’s asserted need for an identifiable property interest, other
holdings diverge and apply takings analysis in a different
manner.121
In Webb’s Fabulous Pharms., Inc. v. Beckwith,122 the Supreme
Court held that a government exaction of money related, not to a
specifically identifiable property interest, but to any property interest, could constitute an illegal taking.123 In Webb’s, the Court addressed whether a state statute allowing the county court to retain
the interest earned on an interpleader fund deposited with the
court’s clerk was unconstitutional.124 The Court determined that
because the funds qualified as private, personal property, the interest earned on those funds was also private property, therefore qualifying the seizure of the interest as a taking.125 The fact that the
Court held the funds for a period of time did not “recharacteriz[e]
the principal as ‘public money.’”126 The Court held that “a State
. . . may not transform private property into public property without
compensation . . . This is the very kind of thing the Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment was meant to prevent.”127
The need for an identifiable property interest prompted the
Court to find a link between land use conditions and the property
itself.128 In City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes,129 the petitioner
claimed that the city’s repeated rejection of a landowner’s applica120. See Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 541 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (noting asserted factors required
to execute takings analysis).
121. Compare Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (holding government mandated reduction of liens infringed on identifiable property interest),
with Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935) (holding act
requiring banks to allow mortgagors to keep property at lower-appraised rate was
deprivation of identifiable property interest), and Webb’s Fabulous Pharms., Inc. v.
Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980) (holding government exaction of money related to
any property interest constituted taking) (emphasis added).
122. 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
123. See id. at 164-65 (emphasis added) (explaining holding of unconstitutionality).
124. See id. at 161 (discussing issue of case). The total interest on the account
in question exceeded $100,000. Id.
125. See id. at 164 (declaring interest as private property subject to protection
from seizure).
126. Id. at 164 (noting court’s possession of money did not change its status as
private).
127. See Webb’s, 449 U.S. at 164 (declaring holding of case).
128. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687,
687-88 (1999) (discussing link between exactions and land allowing for analysis
under Nollan-Dolan test).
129. 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
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tions for land development constituted a taking.130 Upon review,
the Supreme Court addressed whether the Dolan test was the
proper analysis to execute under the circumstances of this takings
claim.131 Ultimately, the Court refused to extend the Dolan test to
this set of facts, as it had “not extended the rough-proportionally
test of Dolan beyond the special context of exactions – land use
decisions conditioning approval of development on the dedication
of property to public use.”132 Accordingly, Del Monte Dunes exhibits
a limitation to the test’s applicability.133
The Supreme Court has held that monetary exactions required
as a condition to approval of a land use permit do not necessarily
violate the Takings Clause.134 In Koontz v. St. Johns River Water
Mgmt. Dist.,135 a landowner applied for permits to develop parcels
of land.136 The permitting agency conditioned approval of the permits on the landowner’s completion of one of two options: the
landowner could (1) deed a portion of his land to the locality as a
conservation easement, or (2) agree to fund environmental improvements on parcels of land the locality owned, while leaving his
entire development untouched.137 The Supreme Court reviewed
these conditions to determine whether they constituted a taking.138
Koontz provides guidance for analyzing a takings claim when a
monetary exaction, rather than a specific piece of property, is the
subject of the claim.139 In its analysis, the Court first responded to
the assertion that a link be required between the monetary demand
and an identifiable property interest.140 In distinguishing Justice
130. See id. (noting petitioner’s claim). The petitioner claimed that this denial should be analyzed under the Nollan-Dolan test despite its contrast with the
facts of those cases. Id. Here, the alleged taking was claimed through the repeated
denials whereas in Nollan-Dolan, the focus was considered excessive exactions. Id.
131. See id. at 702-03 (discussing issue to be determined).
132. Id. at 702 (declining to extend Dolan).
133. See City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 702 (limiting extent of Dolan test).
134. See Koontz v. St. John’s River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2601
(2013) (citation omitted) (discussing precedent leading to conclusion that penalties do not necessarily constitute taking).
135. 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
136. See id. at 2589 (discussing facts of case).
137. See id. at 2592 (discussing locality’s conditions to approval). The improvements that that locality sought to implement included “replac[ing] culverts
on one parcel or fill[ing] in ditches on another.” Id. These projects would have
improved roughly fifty acres of land. Id.
138. See id. at 2599 (discussing review of takings claim).
139. See Contino, supra note 5, at 490 (discussing significance of Koontz in
takings jurisprudence).
140. See Koontz v. St. John’s River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 25992600 (2013) (identifying property interest at stake).
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Kennedy’s assertion in Eastern Enters., the Court noted that the
monetary demand in Koontz burdened the petitioner’s ownership of
a specific piece of land.141 Accordingly, the Court declared “[t]he
fulcrum this case turns on is the direct link between the government’s demand and a specific parcel of real property.”142 This direct link, the Court opined, implicated the need for the application
of the Nollan-Dolan test.143 While the Court remanded the case for
a decision consistent with its holding, Koontz broadens the understanding of a taking and asserts that a taking can occur even absent
any physical seizure of land or money.144
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Kagan rejected the application
of the Nollan-Dolan test.145 Justice Kagan disagreed with the majority’s extension of the Nollan-Dolan test to include conditions demanding money rather than physical property.146 This test, Justice
Kagan argued, aims to “provide an independent layer of protection
in the ‘special context of land-use exactions.’”147 In that situation,
the “government demands that a landowner . . . surrender a piece
of real property” in order to obtain a permit.148
Koontz stands as a beacon for lower courts in determining takings claims directed at monetary exactions.149 In fact, the court in
Horne heavily relied upon Koontz’s reasoning to reach its own conclusion.150 Ninth Circuit decisions leading up to Horne, however,

141. See id. at 2600 (distinguishing Eastern Enters.).
142. Id. at 2600 (emphasis in original) (discussing key linkage between monetary demand and specific property).
143. See id. (pointing out need to implement Nollan-Dolan test).
144. See id. at 2603 (discussing order). On remand, the Florida Appellate
court found that, upon application of the Nollan-Dolan test, the conditions imposed constituted a taking. See St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 2014 WL
1703942 (Fla. April 30, 2014). See also Contino, supra note 5 at 483, 494-500 (discussing extent and impact of Court’s decision in Koontz).
145. Koontz v. St. John’s River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2607
(2013) (Kagan, J. dissenting) (rejecting reasoning behind Court’s opinion).
146. Id. (Kagan, J. dissenting) (asserting main contention with Court’s
opinion).
147. Id. at 2604 (Kagan, J. dissenting) (discussing narrow applicability of test).
148. Id. (Kagan, J. dissenting) (discussing context for application of NollanDolan test).
149. See Horne v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 750 F.3d 1128, 1137 (9th Cir.
2014) (noting instructive nature of Koontz). The Court stated that it founds Koontz
“instructive” in determining whether monetary exaction in question constitutes a
taking. Id.
150. For further discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Horne, see infra
notes 173-219 and accompanying text.
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have looked to related precedents to interpret similar issues, and
have come to different conclusions.151
E. Ninth Circuit Application of Takings Jurisprudence
The Ninth Circuit has sought to determine under what circumstances the Nollan-Dolan test should apply.152 In West Linn Corporate
Park, LLC v. City of West Linn,153 the court refused to extend the
Nollan-Dolan test to the funding of off-site public improvements.154
In West Linn, a landowner claimed that the various conditions the
city placed on its approval of his proposed development constituted
a taking.155 Specifically, the city required the developer to fund several off-site public improvements with his personal money and
property.156 There was no condition requiring any dedication of
real property.157 The developer contended that the conditions ran
amiss to Dolan’s “rough proportionality” test.158 The Ninth Circuit,
however, distinguished Dolan, as there was no required dedication
of real property in this case.159 Accordingly, as “[t]he Supreme
Court has not extended Nollan and Dolan beyond situations in
which the government requires a dedication of private real property . . . [w]e decline to do so here.”160
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the extent to which the Nollan test
must apply in Commercial Builders of N. Cal. v. Sacramento.161 In Commercial Builders, a city ordinance conditioned certain building permits on payments aimed to offset the burdens placed on the city by
the development and to provide lodging for low-income workers
who moved there to fill jobs associated with the development.162
The developers argued that this requirement constituted an impermissible means of advancing the city’s interest that amounted to a
taking of their monetary funds.163 Specifically, they argued that the
151. For further discussion of Ninth Circuit analysis of takings cases, see infra
notes 152-72.
152. For a discussion of Ninth Circuit’s examination of takings claims, see
infra notes 152-72 and accompanying text.
153. 428 F. App’x 700 (9th Cir. 2011).
154. See id. at 703 (9th Cir. 2011) (describing outcome of case).
155. See id. at 701-02 (discussing petitioner’s claim).
156. See id. at 700 (articulating City’s conditions on development).
157. See id. at 701 (describing City’s conditions on development).
158. See West Linn, 428 F. App’x at 702 (describing petitioner’s claims).
159. See id. (discussing differences between Dolan and this case).
160. Id. (declining to extend Nollan-Dolan test to facts of West Linn).
161. See, Commercial Builders of N. Cal. v. Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 874
(9th Cir. 1991) (discussing applicability of Nolan test).
162. See id. at 873 (describing stipulations of city ordinance).
163. See id. (describing crux of developers’ claims).
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precedent set in Nollan required the city to prove that the development was directly related to the impact on the city.164 In its evaluation of the claim, the Ninth Circuit refused to extend Nollan, noting
that no other circuits “have interpreted [Nollan] as changing the
level of scrutiny to be applied to regulations that do not constitute a
physical encroachment on land.”165
Years later, the Ninth Circuit relied on this precedent in adjudicating San Remo Hotel L.P. v. San Francisco City & Cnty.166 In San
Remo Hotel, a hotel claimed that a city ordinance prohibiting it from
converting its residential rooms into tourist use was an unlawful taking.167 The hotel sought review of the lower court’s refusal to implement the Nollan-Dolan test and claimed that it should be applied
to the facial and as-applied challenges to the ordinance.168 The
Circuit Court, however, again declined to extend the test, and cited
its own precedent as evidence.169 It approved of the lower court’s
rejection of the test because it was “equivalent to the approach
taken in this circuit, which also has rejected the applicability of Nollan/Dolan to monetary exactions. . . .”170
Since the Supreme Court promulgated the Nollan-Dolan test,
federal circuit courts have split when determining the extent to
which the test should apply to takings claims that do not specifically
involve real property, a dedication of land, or a condition imposed
on real property.171 These inconsistencies prepared the stage on
164. See id. at 874 (arguing for court to apply Nollan to facts at hand).
165. Id. (citations omitted) (noting Nollan has only been applied to cases specifically involving real property).
166. See San Remo Hotel L.P. v. San Francisco City & Cnty., 364 F.3d 1088,
1097-98 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’d 545 U.S. 323 (2005) (citing Commercial Builders of
N. Cal. v. Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 1991)) (discussing past
precedent).
167. See id. at 1091-93 (discussing facts of case).
168. See id. at 1098 (discussing hotel’s claim).
169. See id. (rejecting application of Nollan-Dolan test).
170. Id. (reaffirming Ninth Circuit’s stance Nollan-Dolan test does not apply to
monetary exactions). The Ninth Circuit defended its reliance on this precedent
despite its issuance before Dolan had been promulgated in asserting that the
“rough proportionality” requirement “simply refined the test articulated in Nollan”
and therefore Commercial Builders was still reliable. Id.
171. Compare Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1578 (10th Cir.
1995) (“In our judgment, both Nollan and Dolan follow from takings jurisprudence’s traditional concern that an individual cannot be forced to dedicate his or
her land to a public use without just compensation. That is, Nollan and Dolan
essentially view the conditioning of a permit based on the transfer of a property
interest—i.e., an easement-as tantamount to a physical occupation of one’s land.”),
and B.A.M. Dev., L.L.C. v. Salt Lake Cnty., 282 P.3d 41 (Utah 2012) (“A development exaction is a government mandated contribution of property imposed as a
condition of approving a developer’s project.”), and Sea Cabins on the Ocean IV
Homeowners Ass’n v. City of N. Myrtle Beach, 548 S.E.2d 595, 603 n. 5 (S.C. 2001)
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which Horne would be received and lent in the development of a
Ninth Circuit opinion that could be interpreted as inconsistent with
its own precedent.172
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals entered into the “doctrinal
thicket” of takings jurisprudence in its analysis of the Marketing Order and attempted to navigate the underbrush through its analysis
and application of Supreme Court precedent.173 The court first
sought to identify the specific property at issue.174 It then proceeded to ascertain whether an actual taking had occurred.175 After extensive discussion, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the NollanDolan test was appropriate for determining whether the Marketing
Order’s reserve requirements qualified as an unconstitutional taking.176 The court then applied the test to the Marketing Order’s
reserve requirements and found the regulation did in fact pass the
“essential nexus” and “rough proportionality” tests, and therefore
was not an unconstitutional taking.177
A. The Initial Inquiry: What Was Taken?
At no time were raisins ever physically exacted from the
Hornes.178 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit set out to determine
(South Carolina Supreme Court stated Dolan “rough proportionality” test applied
only to physical exactions), with Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429 (Cal.
1996) (California Supreme Court holds rough proportionality test applied to nonpossessory exactions, in the form of individual and discretionary monetary fees).
172. For a further discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Horne, and a
critical analysis of that opinion, see infra notes 173-262 and accompanying text.
173. See Horne v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 750 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir.
2014) (noting complex nature of takings case law).
174. See id. at 1136 (describing steps of analysis). The court initially addressed
the threshold issue of standing in order to establish the Hornes as a viable party to
this constitutional challenge. Id. The parties stipulated to the fact that the Hornes
had standing regarding the status of their raisins. Id. The USDA, however, contended that the Hornes lacked standing to challenge any penalty arising from the
sale of raisins produced by third parties. Id. The Ninth Circuit, however, disagreed with this contention. Id. Accordingly, it ruled that, as the injury suffered
was not any obligation to turn over the raisins but rather the penalty for noncompliance, any contention to ownership of the raisins and subsequent seizure thereof
is “irrelevant,” and as such never occurred. Id.
175. See id. at 1137-38 (discussing court’s second inquiry).
176. See id. at 1138-43 (discussing court’s findings). For further discussion of
the court’s findings, see supra notes 174-75 and infra notes 177-219 and accompanying text.
177. Id. at 1143-44 (applying Nollan-Dolan test to facts).
178. See Horne, 750 F.3d at 1137 (noting physical property was never taken).
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what, if any, property was taken.179 The Ninth Circuit agreed with
the argument that the regulation’s penalty for noncompliance was
directly related to a specific governmental act, the Marketing Order.180 Because of this close relation, the court agreed that the constitutionality of the penalty was directly correlated to that of the
Marketing Order itself.181 It based its reasoning on the narrow guidance proffered by Koontz, which analyzed a claim centered on
monetary exactions as a basis for an unconstitutional takings rather
than a physical taking of property.182 Guided by Koontz, the Ninth
Circuit found that, although no money or property was taken from
the owner, a taking could still occur.183
Just as in Koontz, the court found a “direct linkage” between the
monetary exaction, the penalty, and the property at issue: the raisins.184 If the Marketing Order constituted an unlawful taking,
then the penalty for noncompliance violated the Fifth Amendment
as well as the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.185 Conversely,
if the Marketing Order qualified as a lawful exercise of power, so
did the penalty.186
B. Personal Property or Real Property: Analyzing the Hornes’
Claim
1. Dismissal of a Categorical Analysis
The Ninth Circuit considered the three “relatively narrow categories” of takings analysis promulgated through Loretto, Lucas, and
Nollan-Dolan.187 The court disagreed with the Hornes’ argument
that the monetary exactions fell within the scope of Loretto for two
reasons: (1) the Marketing Order applied to personal, not real
179. See id. (citing Koontz, 133 S.Ct. 2586, 2601 (2013)) (noting holding that
fines generally do not constitute taking). The court noted that the “imposition
and collection of penalties and fines [generally do] not run afoul of the Takings
Clause.” Id.
180. See id. at 1137 (discussing perspective of court). The Ninth Circuit
agreed with the Hornes’ assertion that the two were inextricably intertwined. Id.
181. See id. (citing reason for analyzing constitutionality of penalty).
182. See id. (discussing its reliance on Koontz).
183. See Horne, 750 F.3d at 1137 (discussing its reliance on Koontz). The court
noted that it viewed the doctrine of Koontz as only clarifying the narrow “range of
takings cases in which Nollan and Dolan provide the rule of decision.” Id. at n. 11.
For a further discussion on Koontz, see supra notes 134-151 and accompanying text.
184. See id. (applying authority of Koontz to present matter).
185. See id. (discussing implications of finding Order as taking).
186. See id. (describing conditions needed to achieve alternate result).
187. See id. at 1138. (discussing three frameworks of categorical takings). For
further discussion of three cases see supra notes 62-98 and accompanying text.
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property, and (2) the structure of the Marketing Order assured that
the Hornes were not divested of all of their property rights.188
The distinction of the Marketing Order’s operation upon personal rather than real property acted as a significant factor in the
court’s dismissal of Loretto.189 The court asserted that, while the alleged taking interfering with personal property did not render the
Takings Clause inapplicable, the protections afforded to such property are far less encompassing.190 In drawing this conclusion, the
Ninth Circuit relied on Supreme Court dicta from Loretto and Lucas
to infer the tendency to allow for greater leniency regarding government regulation of personal property.191
First, the court interpreted Lucas to imply that personal property rights are less immune to a governmental taking than real
property rights in stating: “the comparative language of Lucas
[makes] clear that the Takings Clause affords more protection to
real than to personal property.”192 Second, the court pointed to
the “narrow reach” of Loretto as explicitly limited to “land or real
property.”193 The court also noted that Loretto cited “virtually only
cases pertaining to real property” and never once considered a governmental occupation of personal property.194 This factual distinction, coupled with inferred diminution of protection for personal
property asserted in Lucas, led the Ninth Circuit to decline to apply
Loretto to the case at hand.195
188. See Horne, 750 F.3d at 1139 (discussing contentions of disagreement).
The Hornes advocated for the use of the authority; however, the court disagreed.
Id.
189. See id. (discussing reasons for disagreement).
190. See id. (inferring Supreme Court precedent to afford less protection to
personal property from takings).
191. See id. (citing authority relied on for assertion).
192. See id. at 1139-40 (citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992)) (discussing reasoning of Lucas).
193. See Horne, 750 F.3d at 1140 (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015) (stipulating
narrow applicability of precedent).
194. Id. (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015) (discussing reasoning).
195. Id. (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015) (discussing reasoning). The Ninth
Circuit bolstered its dismissal of Loretto by examining another major impact of that
ruling: that a deprivation of virtually all valuable use of property qualifies as a taking. Id. at 1140-41. The court asserted that the Hornes were not deprived of the
entire value of the raisins by virtue of the structure of the Marketing Order. Id. at
1140. The Marketing Order itself provided for a return of the portion of the profits from the reserved raisins. Id. Even with the possibility that the return may total
zero in some years, the “distribution is not zero every year.” Id. at 1141. Even in
those years of zero return, the profits will still be used to fund the program, which
represents the Hornes and all other raisin farmers by helping to stabilize the market to provide for a constant outlet for the Hornes’ business to prosper. Id. In
other words, the value of the exacted raisins is constantly being used for the benefit of the Hornes, regardless of whether that benefit is in the form of monetary
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2. Adopting the Nollan-Dolan Test
The court determined that the Nollan-Dolan test was the most
appropriate way to assess and execute the evaluation of the Horne’s
takings claim.196 To reach this conclusion, the court likened the
reserve requirement of the Marketing Order to a use restriction on
the Horne’s personal property, and then analyzed that use restriction in the context of land use permitting.197 The court noted,
however, that this application of the Nollan-Dolan test applied
strictly to the intricacies of this case and should not be regarded as
a blanket rule.198
The court first explained how the regulation was akin to a use
restriction in that the Hornes “voluntarily chose to send their raisins into the stream of interstate commerce.”199 As the USDA never
authorized a forced seizure of the crop, the reserve requirement
acted as a mere condition of the Hornes’ use of their crops through
regulating its sale.200 Since the Nollan-Dolan test “govern[ed] this
[personal property] use restriction as well as it does the land use
permitting process,” the court proceeded to analyze the facts under
it.201
The court proceeded to note a number of other analogous
facts to bolster its reliance on the Nollan-Dolan test.202 All three
cases involved a “conditional exaction,” all three conditionally
granted a government benefit in exchange for that exaction, and
all three involved a voluntary choice by non-government actors.203
If the Hornes wished to avoid the regulations, they needed only to
“[plant] different crops” or “[sell] their grapes without drying
them.”204 Using these parallels to support its rationale, the court
profits. Id. Accordingly, the court found that the exactions did not deprive the
Hornes of the entire value of their property. Id.
196. See id. at 1141-42 (discussing reliance on Nollan and Dolan).
197. See id. at 1141 (discussing courts method in adopting test).
198. See Horne, 750 F.3d at n. 18 (noting court’s limited application on test to
facts of case). The court noted that given the Hornes’ “significant but not total
loss of [their] possessory and dispositional control over their reserved raisins,” the
application of the test was appropriate. Id.
199. See id. at 1142 (noting Hornes’ choice to place goods in market).
200. Id. (describing court’s perspective on facts of case).
201. See id. (noting belief test applied to analyzing use restrictions).
202. See id. at 1143 (noting related facts of each case).
203. See Horne, 750 F.3d at 1143 (describing similarities between cases). Here,
the court asserted that there existed (1) a conditional exaction through the “loss
of possessory and dispositional control,” just as there was in Dolan through the
granting of an easement, (2) a benefit given in exchange for that exaction, and (3)
all involved choice. Id.
204. See id. (describing alternative methods of farming to avoid regulation).
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ruled that the Hornes’ claim would be evaluated under the framework of the Nollan-Dolan test.205
C.

Application of the Nollan-Dolan Test

After resolving to apply the Nollan-Dolan test, the Ninth Circuit
evaluated whether an “essential nexus” existed between the state
interest and the imposed regulation.206 Specifically, the reserve
program must have “further[ed] the end advanced as [its] justification.”207 The court found that the policy requiring reservation of a
proportion of annual raisin production had adequately stabilized
the supply curve and eliminated severe price fluctuations.208
Therefore, the program sufficiently achieved the end sought, a stable, constant market.209 Accordingly, the court found a nexus
existed.210
The court then proceeded to determine whether the benefit
from the regulation was “roughly proportional” to the burden imposed by the regulation.211 While the Dolan portion of the test does
not require a “precise mathematical calculation,” it does require an
“individualized determination” that the condition is related to the
alleged impact of the action.212 Here, the court found the Marketing Order unquestionably complied with the test, as the reserve requirement was “not just in ‘rough’ proportion to the goal of the
program, but in more or less actual proportion to the end of stabilizing the domestic raisin market.”213
The court noted its belief that the “individualized” requirement did not foreclose the specific application of the test to the
general application of the reserve requirement.214 While individualized review makes sense in the context of land use, it would not
necessarily be as useful in cases involving readily available items
such as raisins.215 The Ninth Circuit asserted that the individual
205. See id. at 1143 (concluding use of Nollan-Dolan test is appropriate).
206. See id. (citing Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987))
(discussing holding of case).
207. See id. (discussing analysis under Nollan and Dolan).
208. See Horne, 750 F.3d at 1143 (discussing findings of court).
209. See id. (stating goals of Marketing Order).
210. See id. (discussing conclusions of court).
211. See id. at 1143-44 (discussing courts initiation of Dolan portion of test).
212. See id. at 1143 (noting specifics of Dolan test).
213. See Horne, 750 F.3d at 1143 (emphasis in original) (discussing findings of
court).
214. See id at 1143-44 (noting and disposing of concerns with terms of Dolan
test).
215. See id. (discussing reasons for test’s application).
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evaluation element acts more as a generalized element than a specific requirement, and is aimed at assuring the regulation in question is narrowly tailored to the specific interest the government
seeks to protect.216 The Marketing Order met this goal by revising
its requisite percentage for reserve annually.217 Accordingly, the
court found the Marketing Order “at least roughly proportional to
its goals.”218 Since both prongs of the Nollan-Dolan test were satisfied, the Ninth Circuit held that the monetary exactions did not
constitute a taking.219
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Horne represents an expansion of takings jurisprudence
through the Ninth Circuit’s application of the Nollan-Dolan test, a
traditional land use takings analysis, to a case that did not involve
specific, real property at all, but rather, personal property.220 The
court’s implementation of this test seems inconsistent with its own
reasoning, as well as its discussion regarding the protection of real
and personal property interests.221 Further, the circuit court’s reliance on Koontz and its decision to apply the test may have been
misguided and incompatible with both its own case law, and Supreme Court precedent.222
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Distinction of Personal Property and
Subsequent Dismissal of Per Se Takings Analysis
The Ninth Circuit drew a distinction between property rights
associated with real property and personal property, and declared
that categorical per se takings doctrines do not apply to “controversies involving personal property” such as raisins.223 This assertion is
inconsistent with prior precedent, and thus, the court’s ruling de216. See id. (noting courts reasoning for disposing concerns with test).
217. See id. (discussing Marketing Order’s compliance with test).
218. See Horne, 750 F.3d at 1143-44 (discussing court’s conclusion).
219. See id. at 1145 (discussing holding of case).
220. For an analysis of the Ninth Circuit’s application of takings jurisprudence, see infra notes 238-62 and accompanying text.
221. For a further discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s distinction between real
and personal property, see supra notes 224-87 and accompanying text.
222. For a further discussion of precedent, see supra notes 152-72 and accompanying text. For a critical analysis of the precedent’s relevance to the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Horne, see infra notes 220-62 and accompanying text.
223. See Horne, 750 F.3d at 1140 (dismissing authority of Loretto).
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parted from numerous Supreme Court decisions that advise
otherwise.224
The court in Horne concluded that personal property is subject
to greater regulation than real property, and categorical takings
would generally not apply to any situation involving personal property.225 In so deciding, however, the court strayed from a long line
of Supreme Court decisions declaring the seizure of personal property a per se taking.226 The Supreme Court, for example, has required compensation for the seizure of removable fixtures.227 The
Court has specifically declared that, “an owner’s right to these [fixtures] are no less property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment than is rights in land . . . [.]”228 Moreover, the Supreme
Court has asserted that it “finds no distinction between realty and
personalty” when determining whether a per se taking has occurred.229 Even Koontz, despite the Ninth Circuit’s questionable application of precedent, seems to suggest against such a
distinction.230 In Koontz, the Supreme Court’s opinion provides,
where “the government commands the relinquishment of funds
linked to a specific, identifiable property interest such as a bank
account or parcel of real property, a ‘per se [takings] approach’ is
the proper mode of analysis under the Court’s precedent.”231
Thus, the acknowledgement of what the Horne court deems a piv-

224. For a discussion of Supreme Court cases to the contrary, see supra notes
99-112 and accompanying text. For a critical analysis of Supreme Court decisions
to the contrary, see infra notes 220-37 and accompanying text.
225. See Horne, 750 F.3d at 1140-41 (discussing limited protection of personal
property under Fifth Amendment).
226. For a critical analysis of Supreme Court decisions to the contrary, see
infra notes 220-37 and accompanying text.
227. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 at 383-84
(1945) (holding owner’s interest in personal property protected to same extent as
interest in real property).
228. Id. (discussing extent of personal property rights and their protection
under Fifth Amendment).
229. United States v. Burnison, 339 U.S. 87, 93 (1950) (discussing Court’s
reasoning); see also, United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. 623, 628 (1871) (analyzing
seizure of private steamboats for use during Civil War as per se taking); see also,
United States v. Palmer, 128 U.S. 262, 271 (1888) (noting federal use of patent
analyzed as per se taking).
230. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S.Ct. 2586, 2600
(2013) (discussing approach to takings analysis). For a further discussion of the
Ninth Circuit’s application of Koontz, see infra, notes 238-62.
231. Id. (citing Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 235 (2003))
(discussing approach to takings analysis).
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otal distinction between personal and real property seems unique
to this case.232
The Ninth Circuit’s basis for this distinction rests on its analysis
of Loretto.233 Specifically, the court noted language from the case
directed at “real property” as the factor excluding the Loretto’s application to matters involving property interests other than those
involving realty.234 Since, according to the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court “cit[ed] virtually only cases pertaining to real property” in Loretto, its application must be tailored to those instances.235
Cases leading up to and following Loretto, however, suggest otherwise.236 Moreover, following its construction of this framework distinguishing real from personal property, the court effectively
disregarded its distinction and subjected the Hornes’ personal
property to the Nollan-Dolan test for realty and land use.237
B. The Circuit’s Questionable Application of the Nollan-Dolan
Test
Immediately following a discussion refusing to apply certain
categorical takings analyses based merely on the fact that the raisins
were personal and not real property, the Ninth Circuit resorted to
the Nollan-Dolan test, a framework normally reserved for evaluating
conditions on realty and land use.238 The court relied on Koontz to
guide its analysis.239 In doing so, the court seemingly avoided years
of Supreme Court case law as well as its own precedent, which more
aptly addresses the Marketing Order and whether it constituted a
taking.240
First, the Ninth Circuit’s connection of the doctrine promulgated in Koontz appears strained and somewhat unclear.241 In
232. For further discussion of this distinction, see infra notes 220-62 and accompanying text.
233. See Horne v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 750 F.3d 1128, 1140 (9th Cir.
2014) (analyzing Loretto).
234. See id. (discussing scope of Loretto’s holding).
235. See id. (noting limited applicability of Loretto).
236. For a critical analysis of takings jurisprudence advocating the opposite
interpretation, see infra notes 220-62 and accompanying text.
237. For further analysis of court’s reasoning, see supra notes 206-19 and accompanying text. For a critical analysis of this approach, see infra notes 220-62 and
accompanying text.
238. See Horne, 750 F.3d at 1141-43 (noting Nollan-Dolan test as appropriate for
inquiry).
239. See id. at 1137-38 (discussing analysis and implementation of Koontz).
240. For a discussion of the possible alternative routes of analysis, see infra
notes 238-62 and accompanying text.
241. See Horne, 750 F.3d at 1137-38 (evaluating advantages of Koontz).
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briefly establishing its governance, the Ninth Circuit stated that the
“direct linkage” between the monetary exaction and the piece of
land in Koontz guided the Supreme Court to apply “substantive takings jurisprudence relevant to land for the purpose of whether the
related monetary exaction constituted a taking.”242 The Ninth Circuit, although noting it in a parenthetical, failed to address the fact
that the “fulcrum of the case [in Koontz and subsequent application
of the Nollan-Dolan test] turns on the direct link [between the monetary exaction] and a specific parcel of real property.”243 In Horne,
the link is not between the exaction and specific real property, but
rather, between the exaction and specific personal property.244
While the circuit court noted that the “specific property” involved
here was sufficient to facilitate compliance with Koontz, it failed clarify why it was no longer required to link specific real property.245
Even accepting the court’s disregard for the important distinction between real and personal property and its strained reliance
on Koontz, the requirement for an “individualized determination”
in any application of Dolan seemingly renders the Nollan-Dolan test
inapplicable in Horne.246 The Ninth Circuit dismissed this because
it did not appear essential in instances of personal property.247
While this may be a reasonable interpretation, it again rests on the
distinction between real and personal property, which was crucial
to the court’s earlier analysis, yet hardly noted upon execution of
the Nollan-Dolan test.248
The court’s reliance on Koontz appears even more misguided
when considering other relevant precedent that may have been better applied to the facts of the case.249 While the court equated the
Marketing Order in Horne to a restriction akin to a condition on
242. Id. at 1137 (citing Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S.Ct.
2586, 2599 (2013)) (discussing link necessary for implementation).
243. See id. (citing Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S.Ct. 2586,
2599 (2013)) (discussing link necessary for implementation).
244. See id. at 1137-38 (noting link in case concerns raisins). “Here . . . [the
link is between] a monetary exaction (the penalty imposed for failure to comply
with the Marketing Order) to specific property (the reserved raisins).” Id. at 1137.
245. Id. at 1137-38 (emphasis added) (noting link between monetary exaction
and specific property allowed Ninth Circuit to apply Koontz authority).
246. See Horne, 750 F.3d at 1143-44 (discussing Dolan’s requirements for “individualized determination”).
247. See id. (explaining why “individualized determination” was not needed in
Horne).
248. See id. at 1140-41 (discussing distinction between personal and real
property).
249. For further discussion of alternative options, see infra notes 238-62 and
accompanying text.
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land use, other Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit opinions address
restrictions similar to the Marketing Order while either utilizing alternative modes of analysis or expressly declining to apply the Nollan-Dolan test altogether.250
The Supreme Court itself stated in City of Monterey that it had
“not extended [the Nollan-Dolan test] beyond the special context of
. . . land use decisions conditioning approval of development on
the dedication of property to public use.”251 Further, the Ninth
Circuit could have reviewed other Supreme Court takings decisions
such as Webb’s.252 Webb’s provided clear guidance to monetary takings that were unrelated to specific parcels of real property, and
expressly prohibited a State’s “transform[ation] of private property
into public property without just compensation.”253 Both Webb’s
and City of Monterey implemented alternative analyses for determining whether a taking occurred.254 Notwithstanding the Supreme
Court’s own reluctance to extend the test beyond the category of
land use issues, the Ninth Circuit has similarly declined to extend
the test to circumstances outside of this specific category.255
In West Linn, the Ninth Circuit explicitly stated that, as “[t]he
Supreme Court has not extended Nollan and Dolan beyond situations in which the government requires a dedication of private real
property . . . [w]e decline to do so here.”256 Moreover, the Ninth
Circuit again declined to extend the precedent of Nollan in Commercial Builders.257 There, it noted that, absent regulations effecting a
“physical encroachment on land,” the level of scrutiny in Nollan was
unwarranted.258 Even further, in San Remo Hotel, the Ninth Circuit
again recognized that its approach of adjudicating takings claims
250. For further discussion of alternative options, see infra notes 238-62 and
accompanying text.
251. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999) (explaining Court’s decision to decline to extend test). For a further discussion of City of
Monterey, see supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
252. For a further discussion of Webb’s, see supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text.
253. See Webb’s Fabulous Pharms., Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980)
(noting illegality of taking without just compensation).
254. For a discussion of Webb’s and City of Monterey, see supra notes 122-33 and
accompanying text.
255. For a discussion of related Ninth Circuit precedent, see supra notes 15272 and accompanying text.
256. West Linn Corp. Park, LLC v. City of West Linn, 428 F. App’x 700, 702
(9th Cir. 2011) (declining to extend Nollan-Dolan test).
257. See Commercial Builders of N. Cal. V. Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 875
(9th Cir. 1991) (discussing holding of case).
258. See id. (declining to utilize Nollan).
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has consistently “rejected the applicability of Nollan/Dolan to monetary exactions. . . .”259
In each of the above cases, the Ninth Circuit never considered
any link between the exaction and the piece of property, regardless
of whether it was real or personal, to implement land use related
takings analysis.260 Aligning the reasoning of these cases with that
of the situation addressed in Horne highlights certain inconsistencies that may be difficult to rectify.261 This case, therefore, may present challenges to lower courts when seeking guidance on related
matters.262
VI. IMPACT
While Horne represents only one drop of an ocean of takings
jurisprudence, its effects may resonate in future lower court decisions.263 Horne expands the Nollan-Dolan test, and legitimizes its application to monetary exactions as they relate to purely personal
property, a far greater expansion than any prior application.264
Moreover, Horne notably opens the door for farmers to assert a takings claim as an affirmative defense to agency enforcement action,
even before any real or personal property has been “taken.”265 This
power could lead to future challenges to similar federal regulations
governing other essential agricultural products such as milk and
honey, as well as challenges to regulations specifically directed at
environmental protection.266
A. Potential Confusion in Future Applications
The Ninth Circuit in Horne expanded the Nollan-Dolan test to
apply to monetary exactions not directly linked to a specific and
259. San Remo Hotel L.P. v. San Francisco City & Cnty., 364 F.3d 1088,
1097–98 (9th Cir. 2004) (declining to extend Nollan-Dolan test).
260. For further discussion of the reasoning in these cases, see supra notes
153-70 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 221-60 and accompanying text.
262. For a discussion of the potential impact on subsequent lower court decisions, see infra notes 263-73 and accompanying text.
263. For further discussion of the impact, see infra notes 264-82 and accompanying text.
264. For a discussion of similar and dissimilar applications of the Nollan-Dolan
test, see supra notes 62-172 and accompanying text.
265. See Seeman, supra note 24, at p.7 (explaining potential for future affirmative defenses based on Horne).
266. See id. (discussing farmers in other agricultural markets that could use
Horne as claim’s basis).
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identifiable real property interest.267 The court stretched a traditionally real property-focused test to encompass purely personal
property, contrasting even its own traditional distinctions between
the two types of property.268 This dichotomy may spell confusion
for future challenges in lower courts.269
Generally, courts have reserved the Nollan-Dolan test solely for
takings affected through land use regulations.270 In contrast, when
adjudicating personal property takings claims, courts have implemented a number of other specific tests.271 The ambiguity that
arises through the Ninth Circuit’s application of a land use test to
personal property may cause considerable confusion and result in a
lack of direction for courts facing similar regulations.272 This application, however, will also depend on the nature and basis of the
potential takings claim.273
B. Future Challenges and Environmental Impact
Future claims against federal regulations governing agriculture
or the environment may rest on the same foundation as Hornes’
challenge.274 Federal marketing orders are not exclusively applied
to raisins; rather, many other essential crops and goods are subject
to federal regulations, such as milk, honey, and certain types of
fruits and vegetables.275 While the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Horne
held the Marketing Order regulating raisins did not constitute a
taking, the proceedings marked a key point for related chal267. See Horne v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 750 F.3d 1128, 1144-45 (9th
Cir. 2014) (discussing expansion and application of Nollan-Dolan test).
268. See id. at 1143-44 (discussing application of Nollan-Dolan test to personal
property). For a further discussion of the application of the test, see supra notes
206-19 and accompanying text. For a critical analysis of the expansion and application of the test, see supra notes 220-62 and accompanying text.
269. For further discussion of possible instances of confusion, see infra notes
267-68.
270. See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 697-98
(1999) (discussing application of Nollan-Dolan test). The Supreme Court had “not
extended [the Nollan-Dolan test] beyond the special context of exactions – land use
decisions conditioning approval of development on the dedication of property to
public use.” Id.
271. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 383-84
(1945) (implementing per se taking analysis to personal property).
272. See infra notes 62-172 and accompanying text for a presentation of similar and dissimilar precedent. See supra notes 220-62 for a critical analysis of this
precedent and its relevance to the matter at issue.
273. For further discussion on various takings claims, see infra notes 62-172.
274. For a description and discussion of the Hornes’ claim, see supra notes 2440 and accompanying text.
275. See 7 U.S.C. § 608c(2) (listing crops subject to regulation).
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lenges.276 Horne clarified that farmers may assert a takings claim as
an affirmative defense to agency enforcement action, regardless of
whether real or personal property has been physically “taken.”277
Allowing this affirmative defense may result in similar challenges to
government regulations or enforcement actions regardless of
whether they qualify as a land use restriction.278 While these possible future claims may prove fruitless under Horne, the Supreme
Court may once again weigh in on this decision and cultivate
grounds on which such claims may have legitimacy.279
Despite the narrow question of standing that the Supreme
Court reviewed during the Hornes’ first appearance before the
Court, several Justices expressed statements that encouraged speculation regarding their opinions of the Marketing Order.280 Justice
Antonin Scalia characterized the Marketing Order’s penalty as giving raisin handlers the choice between “your raisins or your life,”
and actually affording the handlers no true option at all.281 Further, Justice Stephen Breyer described the methods and purpose of
the Marketing Order as “tak[ing] raisins that we grow, [and] in effect throw[ing] them in the river.”282 Although speculating the
Court’s future decisions may be imprudent, the Justices’ comments
offer insight into their potential reasoning. While the Hornes’
challenge may be settled for now, the future may hold a greater
review of the Hornes’ grapes of wrath.
Drew S. McGehrin*

276. See Horne v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 750 F.3d 1128, 1144-45 (9th
Cir. 2014) (discussing holding of case).
277. See Seeman supra note 24 (discussing use of claim as affirmative defense).
278. See John Echeverria, Horne v. Department of Agriculture: An Invitation to Reexamine “Ripeness” Doctrine in Takings Litigation, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS
10735 (Sept. 2013) (discussing consequences of affirmative defense).
279. See supra notes 37-40 for a discussion of the Supreme Court’s initial review and decision in Horne.
280. See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 133 S.Ct. 2053 (2013) (discussing matter at
issue and holding Hornes’ had standing to challenge regulation in federal court).
For a further discussion of the procedural posture of this case, see supra note 38.
281. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 133 S.Ct.
2053 (2013) (No. 12-123), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-123_l537.pdf.
282. See id. at 36 (noting apparent effect of regulation).
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